Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he last 20 years have witnessed a pattern of economic development in many mature metropolitan areas that is broadly characterized by a declining central city surrounded by more prosperous and growing suburbs. Nowhere is this truer than in the D.C. metropolitan area, where the counties of Maryland and Virginia that border the District of Columbia have flourished. As the site of the federal government, the District is unique in many ways, but, as we demonstrate below, the population and employment trends in the D.C. metro area mirror this central-city pattern. In this paper, our primary interest is to determine the role that local government tax and expenditure policies have played in this area's economic development-in the choice of residence and the location of business employment.
Our broader purpose is to update our understanding of intrametropolitan tax competition by studying employment and population growth across jurisdictions in the D.C. metro area. As we discuss below, the sizable elasticities from the literature on intrametropolitan tax effects were estimated in the early 1980s and without the use of panel data techniques. This literature focused primarily on the effects of the local property tax on business activity. We extend this literature along several dimensions. First, we use panel data with a long time-series dimension and include jurisdiction fixed effects. Second, we examine a broader array of state and local taxes with an initial impact on business or on residential location choice. In addition, we include measures of public services and environmental factors such as crime in explaining differences in intrametropolitan growth rates in employment and population.
A commonly heard criticism is that the District's high tax burden is a deterrent to the location of jobs and people. Other commentators counter that quality-of-life factors are dominant in explaining the relative performance of the District. Still others assert that the fortunes of the District are not discernibly different from other central cities in large metropolitan areas, thus implying that cutting taxes to attract employment and people is not likely to be an effective policy.
In this paper, we bring systematic evidence to bear on these various assertions.
In the next section, we briefly and quite broadly summarize the literature on inter-regional and intraregional studies of economic development. In the third section, we compare recent trends in employment, population, and income of the District and its metropolitan area to other central cities and metropolitan areas. This comparison enables us to check the validity of the claim of uniqueness for the District's situation. In the fourth section, we investigate various factors as possible determinants of employment and population growth in the District and eight surrounding suburbs in Virginia and Maryland. The final section of the paper provides conclusions.
ECONOMETRIC STUDIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
From individual firm location decisions to aggregate regional employment growth rates, researchers have attempted to determine whether taxes and other policy variables are significant factors in explaining why some regions outperform others. In Mark, McGuire, and Papke (1997) , we survey the vast empirical literature on this topic in a search for consensus findings. Our job is made easier by the fact that several surveys of the relevant literature have been conducted in recent years. Fisher (1997) , Wasylenko (1997) , and Bartik (1991) discuss both inter-regional and intraregional studies. The interregional studies examine differences in economic development across states or SMSAs. The intraregional studies examine differences in investment or employment across communities within a given metropolitan area. The distinction is a sensible one since the set of important factors is likely to differ for inter-regional location decisions compared to intra-regional decisions. In particular, because many labor market and cost factors are constant within a given region, taxes, which vary from one locale to another within a region, might be expected to be more important factors in intraregional decisions.
We conclude that many, but not all, inter-regional studies find that taxes are a statistically significant factor. For example, the two most recent studies, Hines (1996) , who examines the location of foreign branch plants in the United States, and Tannenwald (1996) , who examines investment by manufacturing companies, come to opposite conclusions about the effect of taxes. Often in this literature the findings are not robust to changes in specification, time period, or measurement.
Typically, in these studies, when taxes are statistically significant, the size of the effect is not large economically.
1 Other factors, such as labor costs or labor quality, tend to be more important. These empirical findings are supported by the evidence from surveys of firms, which consistently place taxes low on the list of critical factors in making location decisions.
A different conclusion from this literature is that there is a role for publicly provided services in shaping an environment conducive to business. Many of the studies examine both taxes and government expenditures and find that spending on education, highways, and other types of services likely to be valued by firms has a positive effect on economic activity. In our empirical work below, we examine the influences of both taxes and spending on public services.
In contrast, intraregional studies more consistently find a negative effect of property tax differentials on local economic activity. Several studies of intrametropolitan business location studies were published in the early 1980s. Wasylenko (1980) examines relocations of firms among Milwaukee suburbs, Fox (1981) studies the amount of industrial land in use in the Cleveland area, Charney (1983) examines new-firm density in Detroit, and McGuire (1985) examines the location of building permits in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. All four studies find local taxes to be statistically significant determinants of economic activity with reported elasticities with respect to the property tax rate of about -2.0.
We believe the influence of local government policy and environmental factors on economic activity should be reexamined for several reasons. First, none of these earlier intraregional studies used panel data techniques and so were unable to control for unobserved jurisdiction characteristics that may confound the effects of taxes on business location (see Papke, 1991) . Our data covers 26 years and 9 jurisdictions. Also, these studies focus primarily on the local property tax, while there may be relevant local differences in sales or income taxes as well. Since our nine jurisdictions are located in two different states and the District, we have variation in several types of taxes. Further, we are interested in the effects of local policy on overall economic activity-both business and residential location. Finally, earlier estimates use data from the 1960s and 1970s, a very different period for central cities and their surrounding suburbs.
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In the next section, we describe the more recent metropolitan experience that sets the context for our empirical work.
A COMPARISON OF WASHINGTON, D.C. TO OTHER LARGE CITIES AND THEIR SUBURBS
To place recent economic and demographic changes in the District and its metropolitan area in context, we compare the performance of the 20 largest cities in 1980 (which includes Washington, D.C.) plus Atlanta and Boston since they are currently similar to the District in size. We compare the population, employment, and income growth of these cities and their metropolitan areas. The data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (metropolitan areas) and the Bureau of the Census (cities). Because these two sources differ, the data are not perfectly comparable, but we are unaware of any other comprehensive source of data that covers several years for metropolitan areas and their component cities.
Population Growth
Table 1 presents population growth rates for the 22 cities and their metropolitan areas over two time periods: 1970-92 and 1986-92 (1992 is the most recent year available from the Census for cities). The fastest growing metropolitan area over the more than 20-year period was Phoenix, with growth of 122 percent. During this period, three metropolitan areas actually lost population. The average growth rate for the 22 areas was 21 percent, while the population growth rate of the District metropolitan area exceeded this average with 35 percent.
The 22 central cities did not fare as well as their metropolitan areas from 1970 to 1992. The average growth rate of the cities was essentially 0 compared to the average metropolitan area growth rate of 21 percent. While several central cities, largely cities in the west, experienced rapid population growth, many others lost population, including the District, which lost nearly 23 percent of its population over the period. Only Cleveland and Detroit lost greater percentages of their populations during this period. It is notable that, unlike the District metropolitan area, the Cleveland and Detroit metropolitan areas also lost population over the period.
The story is much the same for the recent period from 1986 to 1992. On average, the metropolitan areas grew much faster than the central cities, and the District metropolitan area grew faster than average; several central cities, including the District, lost population over the sixyear period.
Employment Growth
While the federal government is a large employer in the District (there are about 230,000 public sector jobs and about 450,000 private sector jobs), our concern in this paper is solely with the growth of private jobs in the city relative to the suburbs. In Table 2 , we display private employment growth rates for four major industries over the two-decade period 1972-92. While we are limited to these four industries by the coverage of the Census data, in 1995, these four industries represented 77 percent of total private employment in the United States. Over the two decades, the fastest growing industry in these metropolitan areas was services with an average growth of 116 percent. Manufacturing employment actually declined by 15 percent on average. For three industrial sectors, manufacturing, wholesale trade, and retail, the metropolitan areas outperformed the central cities, but services employment grew slightly faster in the central cities than in the metropolitan areas.
Employment growth in the D.C. metropolitan area was greater than the average of the metropolitan areas for each of the four industries, and notably so for manufacturing. In contrast, manufacturing employment declined in the District proper by 33 percent, a percentage amount slightly less than the average decline of the central cities. The District's services employment growth of 125 percent was virtually identical to the average for the cities, while its employment growth rates in the two trade industries were much lower than the averages for the cities. In 1989, real income per capita was $16,745 on average for the cities, and significantly higher at $23,660 on average for the corresponding metropolitan areas. Both for the District and its metropolitan area, real income per capita was substantially above the corresponding averages, and second only to San Francisco and its metropolitan area (by 1994, the D.C. metropolitan area was third behind the San Francisco and New York City metropolitan areas).
Income Growth
To summarize, with respect to per capita income, both the District and the D.C. metropolitan area have performed well. The growth rate of income per capita over the more than two-decade time period was higher in the District proper and its metropolitan area than for the averages of the comparable areas. In contrast, the poor performance of population growth and employment in the District sharply differs from its metropolitan area. In the next section, we explore which local government policy variables and environmental factors have influenced this poor economic performance.
INTRAREGIONAL ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we examine which factors are the key determinants of population and employment growth in the District and surrounding metropolitan area. Employment growth is of interest for obvious economic development reasons. Population or choice of residence has more than the usual implications for economic activity and the city's financial health since the District is not allowed to tax the income of nonresident workers. Our geographic area includes the District and eight surrounding counties/cities: Charles, Montgomery, and Prince George's Counties in Maryland, and Alexandria City, Arlington, Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties in Virginia.
Methodological Issues
Our estimation strategy is to use an econometric technique that controls for unobserved jurisdiction heterogeneity and to estimate a parsimonious reduced form equation in growth rates, while including our key variables of interest: the tax, service, and quality-of-life variables that may be influenced by policymakers. We examine growth rates in activity to net out systematic differences due to history, or scale effects. In addition, the levels, or logarithms, of these variables are highly persistent. In time-series nomenclature, they have unit roots. With a long time period, we must be aware of the potential for spurious regression (see Wooldridge, 2000) . By using growth rates, we avoid this potential problem.
Our panel data allow us to control for jurisdiction fixed effects. The fixed effects serve two purposes-they allow the jurisdictions to grow at different rates, which is clearly needed in our data; and they control for stable differences in site characteristics that may be correlated with the tax or other explanatory variables.
3 These characteristics include qualitative differences that we are unable to measure and that may be important in determining population or employment changes. Since we cannot control for all relevant factors, this specification gives us considerable robustness against specification error.
We also include year dummies to allow for a flexible annual growth rate for the entire region and for aggregate effects that influence either population growth or the policy and environmental variables. Thus, all estimates measure the effect of, say, the personal income tax on population growth rates net of aggregate regional trends. Because we are controlling for both jurisdiction fixed effects and time dummies, we may be more liberal in what we consider to be significant p values in determining statistical significance.
As mentioned above, we include a fixed effect, or time-invariant unobserved factor, in our model because there are certain factors that influence the growth of population or employment that do not change over time but which we want to allow to be correlated with our explanatory variables (e.g., proximity to the seat of the federal government or perception of crime). However, including the fixed effect is not without potential cost. If there is feedback from a shock to the dependent variable to future values of an explanatory variable, then the strict exogeneity assumption required for consistent estimation fails. For example, if an unusually low growth rate of private employment causes next period's unemployment insurance tax rate to be higher, then strict exogeneity fails. In general, all estimation techniques that researchers use to remove a fixed effect-random effects, fixed effects, and first differencing-will be inconsistent if an explanatory variable in some time period is correlated with the error at time t. The fact that we lag our explanatory variables does not solve the problem.
We would be more concerned about this potential problem if our dependent variable were in levels, rather than in growth rates. Further, the inconsistency of the fixed effects estimator is on the order of 1/T. This means that the bias from using fixed effects when the strict exogeneity assumption fails should be small when the time-series dimension of the panel is large and the series are not highly persistent (Wooldridge, forthcoming) . In our case, T is 26 years, so we feel that the robustness advantages of fixed effects outweigh a potential problem of a small bias.
Our analytical framework attempts to capture factors that influence business and residential location decisions. It is assumed that firms are profit maximizers and consider factors affecting revenues and costs that vary over space in making their location decisions. Within a metropolitan area, these factors are likely to include local taxes and expenditures because they vary by local jurisdiction and are expected to affect costs. Crime, average income, and other social and economic characteristics vary by local jurisdiction and may affect costs or revenues as well.
The residential location decision is based in utility maximization. Thus, factors in the utility function or budget constraint that vary across location will be considered by individuals in making residential choices. Such factors might include taxes and expenditures of local jurisdictions, cost of living differences that vary spatially across the metropolitan area, and quality-of-life characteristics of the various neighborhoods.
In our analysis of population and employment growth rates, we are primarily interested in the effects of public policy variables-public services, taxes with an initial impact on residents in the case of population growth, and taxes with an initial impact on business in the employment growth regressions. We include the personal income, sales, and residential property tax rates in the resident population regressions. We include the corporate income, sales, commercial property, personal property, and unemployment insurance tax rates in the employment regressions. We assume, as in other intrametropolitan studies, that wages and energy costs are equal across these neighboring jurisdictions, and that other rel-evant cost differences are controlled for either with the time or fixed effects. If there is a wage premium for working in the District, say, we assume that it is constant over our time period and is absorbed in the fixed effect, and that annual regional changes are absorbed in the time dummies. We also include two quality-of-life variables-the crime rate and per capita income-which are popularly considered influential in the choice of location of residents and businesses in the D.C. area.
The issue of capitalization arises in interpreting the coefficients on the property tax rates. That is, do differences in land prices across the jurisdictions compensate for differences in the level of taxes paid by residents or firms? In a model with fully mobile labor and capital and a fixed supply of land, tax differentials would cause an offsetting change in land prices and may have no locational effect. Longer-term differences in land prices, as with any other production cost difference that is constant over the 26 years of our sample, will be absorbed in the fixed effect.
5 However, it is unlikely that full capitalization of shorter-term tax differences occurs. First, the conditions for full capitalization do not exist. Many industrial, commercial, and residential (both rental and owner-occupied) users compete for land and face different effective tax rates. Since any particular group is small relative to the locality, full capitalization of their tax rate into local land values is unlikely. In addition, there are many margins from which industrial or residential land can be taken-the supply is not likely to be fixed, even in the short run.
Existing empirical evidence supports less than full capitalization. The strongest case for finding empirical evidence of capitalization is made for the capitalization of local property taxes into residential land values. Tresch (1981) reviews existing empirical studies and concludes from the mixed findings that the pattern of capitalization cannot be predicted. More recently, Guilfoyle (1998) 
Finally, whether the various taxes reduce employment or population growth is ultimately an empirical matter. Since we do not control for land prices in our regressions, we allow shorter-term differences in all the tax rates to be capitalized. The tax coefficients measure the effect of taxes net of any capitalization that may have occurred.
Influences on Population Growth Rates
We examine the influences on the population growth rates for the District and eight surrounding counties from 1969 to 1994. Over this period, the average annual growth rate in population for all jurisdictions was 1.75 percent, but there are striking differences across the jurisdictions. Average annual growth rates ranged from a minimum of -1.18 percent (District of Columbia) to a maximum of 4.38 percent (Loudoun County, Virginia).
In explaining population and employment growth rates, we want to highlight 4 Note that in some instances, even with full capitalization, if land is a small fraction of total costs (as in many industries), land prices could fall to zero and still not be low enough to offset relatively high local property taxes, for example. See Papke (1991) for a discussion. Bartik (1991) argues that even if tax differences are immediately capitalized into land prices, the lower (higher) land price and higher (lower) taxes will cause the land-to-capital ratio of existing and entering firms to rise (fall). Then, for example, in the case of higher taxes capitalized into lower land prices, as business capital investment falls, if capital and labor are complements in the production process, employment will fall. Employment will also fall as businesses exit. Similarly, high taxes borne by residents, if capitalized into rents or housing values, will reduce the profitability and amount of residential capital and therefore the number of residents. 5 When we allow for a jurisdiction effect, we measure the effects of deviations from the average tax rate over the period within the D.C. area, for example.
the effects of local policy-tax rates and public services-and environmental factors. We relate the resident population growth rate to three sets of variables. 6 First, we include the tax rates of taxes initially paid by individuals: the sales tax, the residential property tax, and the personal income tax. Prior work focused on the local property tax, but there is sufficient variation in the local income and sales taxes in our sample that they may be influential. It is natural to think that population does not respond instantly to tax changes so we use the one-year lag of all these variables in the regressions. Our calculation of the local personal income tax rate (on real incomes of $25,000, $50,000, and $75,000 in 1994 dollars) indicates that the District did not stand out as a particularly high personal income tax jurisdiction-the District and Charles, Montgomery, and Prince George Counties have similar rates. The District did have the highest sales tax rates. In 1994, the last year in our time series, the District rate was an average of 6.33 percent, compared to 4.0 or 4.5 percent elsewhere in the region.
The District's residential property tax rates, while higher in the early years of our panel, have fallen to be comparable with or below its neighbors. This metropolitan area may be unusual in that only the District classifies its property. That is, with the exception of three years in Maryland, commercial and residential property tax rates are the same for the other jurisdictions.
Second, we include per capita local public expenditures other than Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments as one measure of public service levels. These expenditures include, for example, public works, public safety, and parks and recreation. We separately include per capita AFDC expenditures to isolate the effect of welfare spending from other public services. Third, we include measures that characterize the quality of life or the environment: per capita income and a per capita crime index derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports. These variables are also lagged one year. Table 4 reports our results for population growth. Column (1) in Table 4 indicates how each jurisdiction grew on average. While all counties except Loudoun grew more slowly than Prince William (the omitted jurisdiction), the District's growth rate was the slowest, averaging about five percentage points (5.1) less each year. Results in column (1) indicate that most (63.2 percent) of the variation in population growth rates initially appears to be explained by permanent differences between the counties. However, a comparison of the unchanging attributes of the District across each column of Table 4 (the D.C. dummy coefficient) indicates that once differences in tax rates and environmental and expenditure policy variables are accounted for, there is nothing left that differentiates the District of Columbia's population growth rate experience. Systematic differences in the explanatory variables explain variations in population growth rates.
Column (2) of Table 4 reports results with the addition of the tax variables; we focus our discussion on the results of the complete model in column (3). Since we include both time dummies and fixed effects, we set our hurdle rate for statistical significance level more generously at p values of 0.10 or less. We report the results that include the personal tax rate on $25,000 of income.
7 A 1 percentage point increase in the personal income tax rate is predicted to reduce the annual population growth rate by 0.81 percentage points (2) and (3) (with a p value of 0.17). A 1 mill increase in the property tax rate is estimated to reduce the population growth rate by 1.23 percentage points (with a p value of 0.16). Residents apparently prefer to live in jurisdictions with higher sales tax rates; a 1 percentage point increase in the sales tax rate is associated with an increase in the annual growth rate of 0.83 percentage points (p value of 0.13). The sales tax, with its potential for export to nonresidents, is thought to be more popular than the property tax, for example. These coefficients imply economically large effects on residential choice, but they do not meet our standard for statistical significance.
The two per capita expenditure variables are included in logarithmic form. We follow the previous literature in measuring the quantity of public services (net of AFDC payments) with expenditures. However, the political economy of our particular geographic area complicates this measure. The District is responsible for a vast array of services, including those that the states of Virginia and Maryland provide for the other jurisdictions. The District's per capita total expenditures are far higher than in the surrounding areas. In our regressions, the coefficient is essentially 0 (with a p value of 0.84).
Expenditures on AFDC, in contrast, are estimated to be a statistically significant and negative influence on residential choice. The estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in welfare spending implies a 0.14 percentage point drop in the growth rate (with a p value of 0.07). We have no measure of poverty rates at the jurisdiction level; but since AFDC expenditures are driven primarily by caseload, this variable may be a proxy for the number of welfare recipients per capita. If so, our results indicate that concentrations of poverty negatively affect population growth. The District's per capita AFDC expenditures are much higher than in the surrounding counties.
Of the environmental variables, per capita income plays a statistically significant role in attracting residents. A ten percent increase in per capita personal income implies a 0.64 percentage point increase in the annual population growth rate (with a p value of 0.05). The District's average per capita income places it in the middle of these jurisdictions.
The District is a well-publicized standout in per capita crime. The District averages about 9 crimes per 100 residents over this period, while, with the exception of Alexandria City at 7.7, suburban jurisdictions average about 4. In our regressions, however, the Federal Bureau of Investigation crime index is practically and statistically insignificant once we control for other factors. It may be that the highly publicized differences in crime rates across these jurisdictions are relatively constant and the effect is absorbed in the jurisdiction fixed effect. Alternatively, since the crime index does not reflect the perceived threat of crime, it may not be the relevant crime measure.
It is instructive to compare the tax coefficients with those from the model without fixed effects. When we re-estimate the model in column (2) without fixed effects, the coefficient on the property tax rate is -2.12 (with a p value of 0.00), the coefficient on the income tax rate is 0.26 (with a p value of 0.07), and the coefficient on the sales tax rate is -2.07 (with a p value of 0.00). After adding the expenditure and service variables to the model as in column (3), the coefficients change sign with two apparently precisely measured. The coefficient on the property tax rate becomes 1.49 (with a p value of 0.05), the coefficient on the income tax rate is -0.20 (with a p value of 0.21), and the coefficient on the sales tax rate is 1.39 (with a p value of 0.00).
The estimates with fixed effects have larger standard errors because we are netting out the jurisdiction average. But there is greater stability in the signs of the coefficients across the models with fixed effects. The behavior of the property tax coefficient seems especially sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects across the different specifications. The most dramatic difference between column (3) with fixed effects and column (3) without fixed effects is in the property tax coefficient. Without fixed effects, the coefficient in the column (3) specification is large, positive, and statistically significant. With fixed effects, the coefficient is large, negative, and marginally statistically significant. Including fixed effects improves the results for the income tax variable as well. In the column (3) specification, the coefficient becomes more negative and its p value falls from 0.21 to 0.17. With fixed effects, the sales tax continues to be positive, but has a smaller estimated effect and larger p value than in the column (3) specification without fixed effects.
To summarize, once we control for jurisdiction and time effects, only two remaining factors have a statistically significant influence on annual population growth. Higher expenditures on AFDC reduce population growth, and higher levels of per capita income increase population growth. The tax effects, while large economically, are only marginally statistically significant.
Influences on the Growth Rate of Private Employment
In this section, we examine the influences on the growth rate in private employment from 1969 to 1994. Over this period, the average annual growth rate for the region was 4.40 percent, ranging from a minimum of 0.78 percent (District of Columbia) to a maximum of 7.36 percent (Prince William County).
We use models and estimation methods that are similar to those for population growth, but we employ a slightly different set of explanatory variables. We relate the growth rate in private employment to three sets of variables-tax costs, service levels, and environmental factors -(again, lagging them one year). We replace the tax rates faced by individuals with tax rates or costs with an initial impact on business (the sales tax, the commercial property tax, the corporate income tax, the personal property tax, and the average cost of unemployment insurance per employee).
With the exception of the personal property tax, District business taxes were highest on average over this period. The District's commercial property tax averaged 1.98 mills, while the next highest average was in Prince William with 1.44 mills. The District franchise tax rate (similar to a state corporate income tax on corporate net income) averaged well above the others (9.3 percent compared to 7 or 6 percent for the two states). As mentioned above, the District had the highest sales tax rate. The sales tax is a revenue source traditionally used by states more than localities, but the District is heavily dependent on it. The District's average unemployment insurance costs were the highest for the region over this period.
Nationally, fewer and fewer states tax business tangible personal propertymany specifically exempt it as an investment incentive. However, all the jurisdictions in this region do use a personal property tax on tangibles. The tax is levied on machinery, equipment, and inventories, and is not particularly high in the District of Columbia. The District ranked sixth in a comparison of average rates, and it exempts inventories-a fact not reflected in our data.
Column (1) of Table 5 indicates that the District employment growth rate averaged 6.6 percentage points less than Prince William County (the base jurisdiction used for comparison). About 23 percent of the variation in employment growth rates is explained by permanent differences between the jurisdictions. But again, as with population growth, the District's experience is not unique once systematic differences in the explanatory variables are taken into account.
The most complete model is presented in column (3) of Table 5 . Higher rates of two business taxes, the personal property tax and the sales tax, are associated with much lower employment growth in the following year. Our estimate indicates that a 1 percentage point higher tax rate on personal property reduces annual employment growth by 2.44 percentage points (with a p value of 0.00). This is an economically large effect and is highly statistically significant. At the means of the sample, this implies an elasticity of employment growth with respect to the business personal property tax of -2.12.
The sales tax also has a similarly sized negative effect on employment growth and is statistically significant at our more generous significance levels (p value of 0.08). We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the sales tax rate reduces the annual growth rate in employment by 2.08 percentage points. This implies an elasticity of -2.17 of employment growth with respect to the sales tax at the means of the sample.
The remaining two taxes-the corporate income tax and the commercial property tax-have the wrong sign and are statistically insignificant. Both variables have measurement problems that may account for this result. Because we do control for school quality, if high property taxes are correlated with high spending on schools, this coefficient may be picking up an effect of good schools on business location decisions.
9 It is difficult to conclude much of anything since the p value is 0.34.
The corporate income tax coefficient is positive, which is not the sign we expected, but because there is little variation in this variable, it has a wide confidence interval. The corporate tax rate varies only across states, and Maryland and Virginia did not change their rates over this time period. The only variation left to relate to employment is the variation over time in the District, and this does not appear to influence employment growth. Statistically, our estimate is not different from zero.
Higher unemployment insurance costs appear to have a negative effect on employment growth, and the estimated coefficient is close to statistical significance with a p value of 0.11. A ten percent increase in the average cost of unemployment insurance is estimated to reduce annual employment growth by 0.21 percentage points. While public expenditures do not appear to play a role in residential choice, they are an important influence on the location of employment. We estimate that a ten percent increase in nonwelfare public spending increases annual employment growth by 0.29 percentage points. This effect is highly statistically significant (with a p value of 0.00) and implies an elasticity at the means of the sample of 0.66. Recall, these are increases in public services apart from AFDC payments-public works and safety, for example.
As in the population growth regressions, employment growth is higher in jurisdictions with higher levels of per capita income. A ten percent increase in per capita income is associated with an increase in private employment growth of 1.41 percentage points (with a p value of 0.05). Crime does not appear to influence employment growth in these regressions. The coefficient on the per capita crime rate (0.008) is essentially zero and has a p value of 0.75.
When we drop the jurisdiction fixed effects for the model estimated in column (3), the coefficients are estimated more precisely because we are not conditioning on a fixed effect. The sales and personal property tax coefficients become more negative (in the decimal places) and more statistically significant. The expenditure coefficient is smaller but still highly statistically significant. The commercial property tax results are qualitatively unchanged.
There are two notable differences. When estimated without fixed effects, the crime rate and the corporate income tax rate coefficients become negative and, in the case of the crime rate, highly statistically significant (the coefficient on the lagged crime rate is -0.011 with p value 0.00, and the coefficient on the corporate income tax is -0.803 with p value 0.13). We know the corporate income tax rate changes over this time period only for the District, so the differences between the jurisdictions are permanent and therefore absorbed in the fixed effect. A similar argument may be made for the crime rate. Thus, while fixed effects do eliminate the statistical significance of some variables, the primary findings remain strong.
To summarize, after controlling for aggregate time and jurisdiction effects, two taxes on business-the personal property tax and the sales tax-have economically large negative effects on the annual growth rate of private employment. The coefficients imply elasticities for these taxes over two in absolute value. Higher unemployment insurance costs exert a marginally statistically significant negative influence. Higher levels of public services aside from welfare payments are associated with greater employment growth, with an estimated elasticity at the mean values of 0.66. Employment growth is greater in jurisdictions with higher per capita income, but appears to be unaffected by crime levels.
Limitations of Our Econometric Analysis
Our conclusions regarding influences of policy variables on economic development in the District and surrounding area must be qualified by the limitations of our data. We have used publicly available tax information, but we have not controlled for the various incentives that jurisdictions offer to business, either as a matter of course or through individual negotiations. Further, in addition to crime, primary concerns in the District area include quality of education services and quality of infrastructure. We attempted to examine these influences, but limitations in school data reduced the sample size in our regressions to the point that we considered the results to be unrepresentative of the area and we could find no reliable measures of public infrastructure quality to use.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the effects of local taxes, public spending, and quality-of-life variables on the location of jobs and people across the D.C. metropolitan area. Because our metropolitan area includes two states in addition to the District, we are able to examine the effects of more types of taxes than previous studies of intraregional location choice. While we have only nine jurisdictions in our sample, our data cover 26 years. Unlike previous intrametropolitan studies, the long panel allows us to control for jurisdiction fixed effects and aggregate time effects. Therefore, we can be more confident that we have uncovered causal effects of the tax variables.
We find that employment growth rates are highly sensitive to the levels of the personal property tax and the sales tax with elasticities greater than two in absolute value. Higher levels of public spending on items other than welfare are associated with higher employment growth rates. These statistically significant tax effects persist even in the presence of jurisdiction fixed effects. Our findings differ substantially from previous work in that we do not find an effect of the local property tax on either residential or business location choice. The previous literature does not include jurisdiction fixed effects, however, which may account for the difference. Like some previous work, we find that nonwelfare public service levels increase economic activity.
Taxes on individuals (personal income, sales, and residential property taxes) and nonwelfare public spending levels are not estimated to be important influences on residential choice. Only two of our factors -per capita AFDC expenditures and per capita income-affect population growth rates. Higher AFDC expenditures, our proxy for poverty, reduce annual population growth, but higher per capita income is associated with both residential and employment location. A 10 percentage point increase in per capita income is associated with a 0.64 and 1.41 percentage point increase in the annual growth rates of population and employment, respectively. We find no evidence that crime rates affect either population or employment growth.
Interestingly, a tax change in the District that postdated our analysis targets the sales tax. In 1995, the District reduced the sales tax to 5.75 percent. The District already exempts inventories from its tax on business personal property, which would reduce its effective rate.
We are able to explain much of the variance in population and employment growth rates across jurisdictions in the D.C. metro area from 1969 to 1994 with systematic differences in tax rates, environment, and quality-of-life variables. While the major influences on population growth appear to be only indirectly in the hands of policymakers, we find that employment growth is sensitive to the level of two businesses taxes, unemployment costs, and nonwelfare public services. These factors suggest avenues that could be pursued for those interested in public intervention to improve the economic performance of metropolitan areas.
We use the flat nominal corporate income tax rate for Maryland and Virginia and the flat nominal rate plus the surcharge on the rate that had recently been imposed in the District. All three states use the three-factor formulathe three-factor average in the District and in Virginia and double-weighted sales in Maryland.
Unemployment insurance costs:
We calculate the unemployment compensation tax payments per employee by applying the average rate charged by each state to the portion of the annual wages that are subject to the tax. For example, this taxable base is currently $10,000 in the District of Columbia, $8,500 in Maryland, and $8,000 in Virginia. A FUTA surcharge is also added. The rates charged by each state are from "Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, 1938 Data, -1993 
